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LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO SERVE ON PANELS
REVIEWING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT IN
SCIENCE
STACEY M. BERG
MONTGOMERY K. FISHER, PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
R ECENTLY public debate has increased about the best way to
detect and address misconduct in science. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin addressed
this issue in Abbs v. Sullivan.' In Abbs, the court evaluated under
the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure
Act the adequacy of procedures used by the Public Health Service
to investigate whether a federally funded researcher falsified or
fabricated certain published research results.2 The science and
popular presses have reported extensively on investigations into
the activities of such prominent researchers as Robert Gallo,
David Baltimore and Thereza Imanishi-Kari, as well as on cases of
confirmed misconduct by researchers such as Stephen Breuning
and John Darsee. 3 While the increased public attention to both
misconduct in science and the attempts to resolve these allega-
tions may encourage individuals charged with resolving such
cases to conduct more thorough and fair inquiries, this attention
* Dr. Fisher is employed by the Office of Inspector General, National Sci-
ence Foundation. When this Article was written, Ms. Berg was also employed by
the Office of Inspector General; she is now in her third year at Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. The opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of Inspector
General or the National Science Foundation. The authors thank Phil Sunshine
and Linda Sundro for their helpful comments.
1. 756 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Wis. 1990), vacated, 963 F.2d 918 (7th Cir.
1992).
2. Id. at 1177. Dr. James H. Abbs, a college professor conducting research
funded by the Public Health Service, allegedly "published certain curves in the
journal Neurology that were traced from curves he had published previously,
rather than being from two different patients" as Abbs represented. Id. Abbs
was the first case in which a court addressed a challenge to the federal agency's
procedures for investigating allegations of misconduct in science against a feder-
ally-funded researcher. The Seventh Circuit vacated this decision on grounds
that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the challenge to the procedures.
Abbs, 963 F.2d at 928.
3. See, e.g., LeonJaroff, Crisis in the Labs, TIME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 45 (discuss-
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will also increase the vulnerability of those individuals to legal
challenge.
Research institutions generally use peer review committees
to investigate allegations of misconduct in science. These com-
mittees must do their job effectively to preserve the integrity of
research, and to ensure that federal grant money is spent in an
appropriate manner. Faced with this duty, scientists may perceive
participation on these committees as too risky to their own ca-
reers because of the substantial possibility of becoming involved
in expensive, time-consuming litigation. One university attorney
described "academic fraud" as a new and growing area in college
and university law, costly for both the individuals and the institu-
tions. 4 A participant of a misconduct committee remarked: "One
of the things we talked about at our first committee meeting was
are we going to get sued or are we liable for anything.'- 5 Because
participation on committees is voluntary, this perceived risk of lia-
bility may completely discourage scientists from serving. Should
this occur, it would severely compromise the ability of the scien-
tific community to address and resolve occurrences of misconduct
in science.
This Article addresses the legal concerns of those individuals
who might become committee members. 6 The authors believe
4. Thomas H. Wright, Faculty and the Law Explosion: Assessing the Impact-A
Twenty-Five Year Perspective (1960-1985) For College and University Lawyers, 12 J.C. &
U.L. 363, 369 (1985) (discussing increasing impact of law on academia).
5. Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research, 1989: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 73 (1989) (statement of Dr. Paul Friedman, Professor
of Radiology and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at University of California
at San Diego, in Summary of Hearing at 11).
6. While this Article addresses the liability of members of committees, in
many cases the institutions themselves may also be liable, and similar law will
apply. The plaintiff's lawyer makes the decision about whom to sue based on
both the state respondeat superior law and what litigation strategy will offer a
more favorable settlement. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, both
public and private institutions might be liable in whole or in part for the tortious
acts of their agents within the course of the agent's employment. See, e.g., Aiello
v. Ed Saxe Real Estate, Inc., 499 A.2d 282, 285 (Pa. 1985) (holding real estate
broker liable for agent's fraudulent misrepresentations about which broker did
not know). For a court to hold an academic institution liable, the institution
must have exercised sufficient control over the "agent." See, e.g., Mazart v. New
York, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 605 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding institution not liable for
acts of its agents when institution has "no right of control" over agent).
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not offer the agent complete pro-
tection, because the institution will always make the defense that the agent's acts
were outside the scope of the agent's authority. See Aiello, 499 A.2d at 285. The
institution is generally not liable for acts committed by an agent outside of the
actual or apparent scope of the agent's authority. Id. The institution may, how-
1362 [Vol. 37: p. 1361
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that their conclusions should alleviate fears that potential com-
mittee members might have about liability stemming from partici-
pation on review committees.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Research Institutions Handle Cases of Possible Misconduct in
Science Under the Aegis of Federal Funding
The misconduct addressed in this Article is defined by fed-
eral regulations that apply to institutions receiving grant money
from federal agencies such as the National Science Foundation
(NSF) and the Public Health Service (PHS). 7 This Article focuses
on the procedures employed by the NSF to deal with allegations
of misconduct in science.8 Many of these procedures are similar
to procedures used by other govermental agencies and the princi-
ples apply government-wide. 9 The NSF's regulations define mis-
conduct as "fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other serious
deviation from accepted practices in proposing, carrying out, or
reporting results from activities funded by NSF," or retaliation
against whistleblowers.10
Institutions receiving federal funding for scientific research
ever, choose or be forced to accept liability for acts outside the scope of an
agent's employment because the institution "ratified" these acts. See, e.g., In re
Banker's Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 882 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that principal not
liable under Pennsylvania law for alleged forgery or fraud of agent unless princi-
pal adopted or ratified agent's acts).
The elements and defenses in the law of torts are the same for both institu-
tional and individual liability, with some minor exceptions. See WILLIAM. A.
KAPLIN, THE LAw OF HIGHER EDUCATION 75 (2d ed. 1985) (outlining personal
responsibility of trustees, administrators and agents). One difference is that in-
dividuals sued in their personal capacities would not be protected by the sover-
eign immunity doctrines that apply to state schools. Id. at 75-78.
This Article focuses on the law in terms of individuals' liability, but when no
equally persuasive case law exists, some points of law developed in the institu-
tional context are cited.
7. The NSF's regulations are located in 45 C.F.R. Part 689 (1992), and the
PHS's regulations are located in 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101-.105 (1992).
8. For a discussion of these procedures, see infra notes 11-25 and accompa-
nying text.
9. Of the many federal agencies that fund scientific research, only the NSF
and the PHS have promulgated regulations specifically addressed to misconduct
in science.
10. 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(a)(l)-(2). Except for the provision regarding retalia-
tion against whistleblowers, the PHS's definition is substantively identical to the
NSF's: "Misconduct or Misconduct in Science means fabrication, falsification, plagia-
rism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly ac-
cepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting
research. It does not include honest error or honest differences in interpreta-
tions or judgments of data." 42 C.F.R. § 50.102.
3
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must have policies and procedures explaining how they will ad-
dress allegations of misconduct in science in connection with fed-
erally funded research." The NSF's regulations stipulate that
there will be no finding of misconduct until an inquiry and inves-
tigation are conducted by the NSF, another federal agency, or the
institution that received the award.' 2
When allegations of misconduct in science are received,
either by a sponsoring research institution or by the NSF, they
trigger a series of events.' 3 NSF officials first establish the
agency's jurisdiction, and then may conduct an inquiry to deter-
mine whether an investigation is required.' 4 In most cases, the
NSF will notify the authorized representative at the sponsoring
research institution of the allegation and ask whether the institu-
tion would prefer to conduct its own inquiry and, if necessary,
investigation.' 5 If the institution requests to conduct the inquiry,
then the NSF formally "defers" to that body.
Whether the allegation is received directly by the research
institution or referred by the NSF, the institution must complete
an "inquiry" within ninety days.' 6 If the allegation is determined
not to have substance, and the allegation originated with the insti-
tution, the matter can be closed and the institution is not required
to notify the NSF.1 7 If the allegation is determined to have sub-
11. The NSF's regulation requires that institutions receiving funds "main-
tain and effectively communicate to their staffs appropriate policies and proce-
dures relating to misconduct, which should indicate when NSF must or should
be notified." 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(d). Institutions receiving grant money from the
PHS must annually supply the PHS with "institutional assurances" stating their
established procedures for handling incidents of misconduct. 42 C.F.R.
§ 50.103.
12. 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(c) ("NSF will find misconduct only after careful in-
quiry and investigation by an awardee institution, by another Federal agency, or
by NSF."). For a discussion of the procedure and substance of such an inquiry
and investigation, see infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
13. This explanation is taken from the "Dear Colleague" letter that the
NSF distributes to its grantee institutions. The letter incorporates many provi-
sions from the NSF regulations. A copy may be obtained by writing to the Office
of Inspector General, NSF, 1800 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20550. The
version referenced in this Article is dated August 16, 1991.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 689.4(c)-(d).
15. Id. § 689.4(d) (permitting Office of Inspector General to "[i]nform the
awardee institution of the alleged conduct and encourage it to make an in-
quiry"). The regulation also notes that "[i]n most instances, NSF will rely on
awardee institutions to . . . [ilnitiate an inquiry into any suspected or alleged
misconduct." Id. § 689.3(a).
16. Id. § 689.3(c). "An 'inquiry' consists of preliminary information-gath-
ering and preliminary fact-finding to determine whether an allegation or appar-
ent instance of misconduct has substance." Id. § 689.1(c).
17. See id. § 689.3(b)(1), (c).
1364 [Vol. 37: p. 1361
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stance based on the initial inquiry, the institution is expected to
conduct its own investigation and, in addition, must notify the
NSF.18 Most institutions routinely use peer panels of their faculty
to conduct such investigations. Generally, these peer investiga-
tion committees are required to provide the NSF with a written
report of their conclusions.' 9 If the investigation committee con-
cludes that the subject committed misconduct in science, the sub-
ject's institution generally imposes a sanction, ranging from a
reprimand to termination of the subject's employment.20
The NSF can either accept the findings of the institution, in
whole or in part, and/or proceed with its own investigation.2 1
NSF oversight officials in the Office of Inspector General assess
investigation reports received from institutions before accepting
them, and give the subject an opportunity to comment on the re-
port.22 Ultimately, if there is a strong case for misconduct, the
NSF's Office of Inspector General issues a final investigation re-
port to the NSF's Deputy Director. 23 This report and the sub-
ject's comments on the report are used as the basis for the Deputy
18. Id. § 689.3(b)(1), .1 (c). "An 'investigation' is a formal examination and
evaluation of relevant facts to determine whether misconduct has taken place or,
if misconduct has already been confirmed, to assess its extent and consequences
or determine appropriate action." Id. § 689.1(c). The regulations state:
In most instances, NSF will rely on awardee institutions to promptly...
(1) Initiate an inquiry into any suspected or alleged misconduct; (2)
Conduct a subsequent investigation, if necessary; and (3) Take action
necessary to ensure the integrity of research, the rights and interests of
research subjects and the public, and the observance of legal require-
ments or responsibilities.
Id. § 689.3(a).
19. Id. § 689.3(b)(4).
20. Id. § 689.2(a) provides a list of possible sanctions, dividing them into
three groups according to severity. Group I actions (minimal restrictions) in-
clude (i) sending a letter of reprimand to the institution or individual; (ii) requir-
ing special NSF approval of particular activities; and (iii) requiring those guilty
of misconduct to certify the accuracy of future reports. Id. § 689.2(a)(1).
Group II actions (more severe restrictions) include (i) restricting activities
or expenditures under an award; and (ii) requiring reviews of all requests for
funding from the effected individual or institution. Id. § 689.2(a)(2).
Group III actions (most severe restrictions) include (i) immediate suspen-
sion or termination of an active award; (ii) debarment or suspension of the indi-
vidual or the institution from NSF programs for a specified time; (iii) prohibition
as an NSF advisor, reviewer or consultant for a specified time. Id. § 689.2(c)(3).
21. Id. § 689.8(a) ("[The Office of Inspector General] will either recom-
mend adoption of the findings in whole or in part or . . . initiate a new
investigation.").
22. Id. § 689.8(c)(2)(i). If the Office of Inspector General (OIG) deter-
mines there is no misconduct, the subject is notified; if it confirms misconduct,
the subject has an opportunity to submit comments or rebuttal, and, if debar-
ment is considered, to contest such action. Id. §§ 620.313, 689.8.
23. Id. § 689.8(c)(2)(ii).
1992] 1365
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Director's decision that misconduct has occurred and for any
sanction the NSF may impose.2 4 NSF's sanctions range from let-
ters of reprimand to debarment, which prohibits the subject from
receiving funds, directly or indirectly, from any federal agency for
a specified period of time.25
B. Factual Predicate
In the type of lawsuit discussed in this Article, the "plaintiff"
is a scientist accused of fabrication, falsification, plagiarism or
other misconduct. 26 The "defendant" is usually either a sponsor-
ing research institution, members of an investigation committee
established at such an institution, or both. 27
24. Id. § 689.9(c)(2)(iii) ("The Deputy Director will review the investigation
report and OIG's recommended disposition.").
25. See id. § 689.2 (listing range of sanctions). For a discussion of these
sanctions, see supra note 20.
26. For a discussion of the definition of "misconduct" in the PHS and the
NSF, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
27. This Article focuses on the liability faced by institutional misconduct
committees. In cases in which a federal agency forms its own committee to assist
the agency's resolution of allegations of misconduct, the legal implications are
very different. These committees would be federal entities, and the committee
members would be agency employees, and thus exempt from individual liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
The right to sue the United States Government is established in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1988). Jurisdiction in such suits is granted to the district courts. Id.
However, § 2680(h) of Title 28 makes an exception for various tort claims aris-
ing out of acts of government employees, including "malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights." See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). While this exception does not include
"investigative or law enforcement officer(s)," the statute defines such officers as
those with authority to search, seize and arrest. Id. Peer review committee
members thus do not fall within this definition and are not excluded from the
exception. Id.; see also Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151,
1156 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (barring injurious falsehood claims against General Serv-
ices Administration officials under exclusion of claims of slander or libel in 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
Section 2680(a) also specifically excludes from the coverage of § 1346(b)
any claim based upon the act or omission of an employee of the government
exercising due care in the execution of a statute or regulation or based upon
discretionary duty. Id. § 2680(a). "[E]mployee of the government" is defined to
include "persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, tem-
porarily or permanently in service of the United States, whether with or without
compensation." Id. § 2671.
Under this definition, members of misconduct committees created by the
NSF would likely be government employees. The FTCA protects government
employees from suit in the same situations in which the government itself is
protected, a kind of inverse governmental respondeat superior. Furthermore,
for purposes of the FTCA, "governmental employee" has included unpaid vol-
unteers such as people in the Peace Corps and Navy trainees. See McManus v.
McCarthy, 586 F. Supp. 302, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Thus, the committee mem-
1366
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An important factor in the assessment of liability is whether
the institution that convenes the misconduct committee is public
or private. This distinction is important in two ways. First, the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes
suits in federal court against public institutions, including state
universities, and their employees acting in an official capacity, un-
less the state has waived its immunity.28 Second, public institu-
tions and their officers are responsible for respecting the rights of
individuals accorded by federal and state constitutions. Accord-
ingly, public institutions and their officers must abide by the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections when any dep-
rivation of liberty or property occurs.2 9
bers, even if they are not paid by a federal agency, would be absolutely protected
by the FTCA from suits for slander, libel or interference with contractual rights.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id. A
state may waive this immunity. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)
(holding waiver valid only when stated expressly or by overwhelming implica-
tion); see also West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying Delaware
law and barring suit against state prison officials acting in official capacity when
damages would be paid with state funds); Vaughan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
504 F. Supp. 1349, 1354 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (holding regents of state university
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). But see Samuel v. University of
Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding state universities liable for
damages and costs for illegal exaction of tuition fees without discussing immu-
nity). It is not necessary for the state to be named as a defendant for the Elev-
enth Amendment protection to apply; the issue is whether the damages would
have to be paid out of state funds. Pennsylvania Dept. of Envtl. Resources v.
Williamsport Sanitary Auth., 497 F. Supp. 1173, 1194-95 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ("The
Eleventh Amendment bars an action by a private party seeking to impose a lia-
bility which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury."). The exact
scope of sovereign immunity is determined by state law. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8522 (1982) (waiving sovereign immunity in government negli-
gence actions). See generally Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 410 N.W.2d
749 (Mich. 1987) (discussing possible exemption from state immunity statute for
claims alleging violation by state of right conferred by state constitution), aff'd,
491 U.S. 58 (1989).
29. The application of these constitutional protections to public institutions
may be limited, however, as the denial of tenure at a public institution has been
held to invoke neither a property interest nor a liberty interest. For example, in
Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University, the federal district court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania held that the discharge of a professor without a pretermina-
tion hearing did not violate due process. Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ.,
412 F. Supp. 1264, 1272-73 (M.D. Pa. 1976). The court determined that the
plaintiff, an assistant professor of Labor Studies with five years of academic pro-
bationary service credit toward tenure, had only a "subjective expectancy of con-
tinued employment" that did not constitute a property interest. Id. at 1272.
The court held that for such an interest to exist, a plaintiff must have "an objec-
tive expectancy based on a specific or implied contract right, a statutory entitle-
ment .... or a defacto tenure system." Id. The court went on to hold that while a
7
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III. COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS FROM LIABILITY FOR
DEFAMATION
The most likely cause of action against an institution or its
misconduct committee members is defamation.30 Defamation is
defined as a communication that "tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
3'
There are two kinds of defamation: oral, known as slander;
and written, known as libel.3 2 Unlike slander, libel is usually ac-
professor does not have a liberty interest in a particular teaching position, the
professor does have a liberty interest in his or her good name such that the state
cannot impair this interest without appropriate procedures. Id. at 1273. The
court noted that deprivation of this interest requires more than mere dismissal:
"[e]ven a dismissal based on a finding of professional incompetence would not
constitute a deprivation of 'liberty' under the fourteenth amendment so as to
invoke procedural due process." Id. at 1274. Similarly, the findings of scientific
misconduct committees should not invoke a liberty interest requiring higher
standards for due process than those already in NSF regulations. These regula-
tions are set out at 45 C.F.R. § 689 (1991).
30. There are, however, other causes of action that might be brought
against individuals on misconduct committees: wrongful interference with con-
tractual relations; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and discrimination
based on race, sex, or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). In University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII as not providing any privilege to
institutions to withhold confidential peer review materials from the EEOC. Uni-
versity of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990). A defamation claim may be
accompanied by one or more of these claims, and similar defenses are available
for at least the first two causes of action. See, e.g., Kassman v. American Univ.,
546 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs alleging libel and wrongful interfer-
ence with contractual relationships). Because the analysis of these causes of ac-
tion is analogous to that of defamation, this Article focuses on the latter. This
section includes areas of law in which statutes exist but are so general that their
scope has been defined almost entirely by the courts. For example, several
states' codes contain sections entitled "defamation" in their civil proceedings
titles, but the substance of these statutes has been determined by court interpre-
tation. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343 (1982) (establishing burden of
proof, located within the Civil Actions and Proceedings title in subchapter enti-
tled "Defamation").
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). This language has
been adopted nearly verbatim by courts addressing defamation claims. See, e.g.,
Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Keddie, 412 F. Supp. at 1276; Corabi v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 273 A.2d 899, 904 (Pa. 1971); Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 583, 586
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
Pennsylvania courts have decided several recent cases in the tenure review
context that are closely analogous to the issue of misconduct review. See, e.g.,
Keddie, 412 F. Supp. at 1264. As Pennsylvania's cases are not obviously contrary
to any perceptible national trends, this Article concentrates on that state's defa-
mation law.
32. See, e.g., Sobel v. Wingard, 531 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(outlining distinction between slander and libel).
8
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tionable without proof of harm.33 Courts have held that if "[t]he
words themselves ... are so obviously hurtful to the plaintiff...
damages may be presumed."3 4 When such a presumption is
made, the statement is said to be "libelous per se."
35
In a defamation action, the plaintiff must prove that the state-
ment is false, harmful to the plaintiff's reputation and made with
the intent to defame. 36 In determining whether a statement is de-
famatory, the allegedly defamatory words must be read in con-
text. 37 The crucial consideration is the nature of the audience,
not the interpretation of the plaintiff.38 In Pennsylvania, the
33. Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, 243 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ill. 1968).
34. Id.
35. Id. Most courts view a publication that could be interpreted as harmful
to a person's reputation as actionable without explicit proof of harm. However,
this interpretation is not universal. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 621 (1977) (declining to state whether harm should be presumed in absence of
proof that defendant published defamatory matter with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for its falsity).
This area of law has been in flux recently. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the
Supreme Court required that actual harm be proven for the plaintiff to win puni-
tive damages. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). In Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., however, the Court appears to have rein-
stated the common law rule that damage to reputation can be presumed by vir-
tue of publication, at least for matters of purely private concern. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-61 (1985).
While Pennsylvania courts appear to have accepted this rule in practice, the state
statute places the burden on the plaintiff of proving "[sipecial harm resulting to
the plaintiff from [the statement's] publication." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8343(a)(6) (1982). However, in Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., the court held
that "a plaintiff in libel in Pennsylvania need not prove special damages or harm
in order to recover; he may recover for any injury done his reputation and for
any other injury of which the libel is the legal cause." Agriss v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 474 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 621 & cmts.). In one case, a plaintiff's testimony that he was
"frustrated, distraught, upset, and distressed about the article and its effect on
his family and friends" was sufficient evidence of actual damages under Penn-
sylvania law and Gertz. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d
1072, 1080 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
37. See MacRae v. Afro-American Co., 172 F. Supp. 184, 186 (E.D. Pa.
1959), aft'd, 274 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1960) ("To determine the meaning of the
article it must be read as a whole and each word must be read in the context of
all the other words.").
38. Rutt v. Bethlehem's Globe Pub. Co.,.484 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) ("The test is the effect the article is fairly calculated to produce, the im-
pression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the average persons
among whom it is intended to circulate.") (quoting Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co.,
273 A.2d 899, 907 (Pa. 1971)); see also Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 583 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980). In Beckman, the allegedly defamatory statement was a univer-
sity professor's communication to the ombudsman about a graduate student's
performance that had been evaluated as inadequate by the departmental exam-
ining committee on two separate occasions. Id. at 585-86. The statement was
found not to be defamatory because it fell within the scope of a conditional privi-
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threshold issue of whether a statement is capable of defamatory
meaning is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact
for thejury. 39 If the court concludes that such a meaning is possi-
ble, it is for the jury to decide whether the audience interpreted
the statement in a defamatory way.
40
While courts differ in defining the precise elements of a defa-
mation cause of action, the substance of the definitions is similar.
Pennsylvania courts, for example, require the plaintiff to prove:
the defamatory character of the communication; its publication by
the defendant; its application to the plaintiff; an understanding by
the reader or listener of its defamatory meaning; an intent to refer
to the plaintiff; special harm; and abuse of a conditionally privi-
leged occasion. 4 1 Also, Pennsylvania courts have held that harm
can include exposing a person to public hatred or ridicule.42
Other courts have also found harm when statements injure a
plaintiff in his or her business or profession.
43
Under this definition, findings of misconduct by an institu-
tion's investigation committee could be considered harmful to a
lege: "the intended audience is a limited one and not one... that would ostra-
cize and shun [the plaintiff] as a result of these statements." Id. at 586-87.
Comment e to § 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has a less strin-
gent definition of defamation, requiring only that statements affect the opinions
of a "substantial and respectable minority" of those in community or associates.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1981).
39. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 923 (3d Cir.); cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990) (citing Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 273 A.2d 899, 907
(Pa. 1971)).
40. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 923 ("[I]f the Court decides [the statement]
is capable of a defamatory meaning, then it is for the jury to decide if the state-
ment was so understood by the reader or listener.").
41. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(a) (1982). Section 8343(a) states that
[i]n an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving,
when the issue is properly raised: (1) The defamatory character of the
communication. (2) Its publication by the defendant. (3) Its application
to the plaintiff. (4) The understanding by the recipient of its defamatory
meaning. (5) The understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be
applied to the plaintiff. (6) Special harm resulting to the plaintiff from
its publication. (7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
Id. Rather than expressly address each requirement in the statute, Pennsylvania
courts generally apply a test similar to the one in the statute. See, e.g., U.S.
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 923.
42. Rutt, 484 A.2d at 76 (finding harm when newspaper article implying
that man did not love his son contributed to son's suicide).
43. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760
(holding publication that plaintiff is bankrupt can be defamatory); Marcone v.
Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078, cert. denied, 474 U.S.
864 (1985) (publication that plaintiff attorney contributed to "grass transac-
tions" capable of defamatory meaning); Elbeshbeshy v. Franklin Inst., 618 F.
Supp. 170, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that employer's statement that em-
ployee lacked cooperation was potentially defamatory).
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subject's reputation. A scientist found to have committed mis-
conduct can expect that colleagues will be less eager to work with
him or her, perhaps because they fear that he or she will discredit
the sponsoring institution or collaborators. Furthermore, find-
ings of misconduct following an institutional investigation will be
communicated to the subject's source of funding, potentially in-
terfering with continued funding.
Other state courts apply a different definition of harm to rep-
utation, with many state courts finding mere negative statements
insufficient to constitute defamation. For example, in Rubenstein
v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, the court held that calling
someone "an old biddy," saying that "she is not suitable for pro-
motion" and that she is "just out to make trouble," in the context
of academic tenure review, were not harmful to the reputation of
the reviewee, as such statements are capable of both defamatory
and nondefamatory meaning, or "innocent construction. ' 44 On
the other hand, in Oilman v. Evans, the court noted that "a
scholar's academic reputation among his peers is crucial to his or
her career." 45 The court acknowledged that if a statement criti-
cizing the views of a professor of political science as Marxist ap-
peared "in an academic publication that purported to rate status
within a given discipline," instead of on the editorial page of a
newspaper, the statement would probably have been
defamatory.
46
Under this standard, a court could find that the report of a
misconduct committee injured a subject's professional reputa-
tion. Comments by committee members concluding that some
act by the subject constituted misconduct would fall into the cate-
gory of remarks that are harmful to a subject's reputation.
Notably, courts have distinguished institutional committees,
whose actions lead to loss of tenure or termination for cause,
44. Rubenstein v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61, 64
(E.D. Wis. 1976); see also Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 989 (D.C. 1984)
("[A]n allegedly defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive;
the language must make the plaintiff appear 'odious, infamous, or ridiculous.' ")
(quoting Johnson v. Johnson Pub. Co., 271 A.2d 696, 697 (D.C. 1970)).
45. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985).
46. Id. at 990; see also Byars v. Kolodziej, 363 N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)
(holding statements by department chair that plaintiff's work was not of quality
or quantity to justify tenure was opinion and thus not actionable in defamation);
Johnson v. Board ofJunior College Dist. #508, 334 N.E.2d. 442 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975) (holding that student statements that professor should be transfered not
defamatory as matter of law).
19921 1371
11
Berg and Fisher: Liability of Individuals Who Serve on Panels Reviewing Allegation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
from those committees that merely fail to promote.47 Debarment
from federal grants or loss of a research position at an institution
limits the scientist's future employment prospects and can de-
stroy the scientist's credibility. The severity of these sanctions
may be considered substantively more akin to termination for
cause than denial of tenure. As such, statements resulting in dis-
ruption of federal funding could well fall within the range of
statements that are interpreted as injuring reputation.
Having demonstrated harm to reputation, a plaintiff must
also show that the allegedly defamatory statement was pub-
lished.48 Statements by misconduct committee members usually
appear in a report from the committee to the head of the institu-
tion, which is then provided to NSF or PHS. Some jurisdictions
have held that internal communications do not constitute publica-
tion for purposes of defamation. 49 For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that a report circulated among university employees stating that
the plaintiff would not cooperate with the dean was not a publica-
tion sufficient to support a defamation cause of action.50 The Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that
communications within the university administration concerning
the reasons for denying plaintiff tenure did not constitute publica-
tion and thus were not defamatory. 5' Finally, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that discussions between two college faculty
members about incidents of theft from student dorms did not
constitute publication.
52
47. Compare Baker v. Lafayette College, 504 A.2d 247, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (holding that college's decision not to reappoint professor to another
term was justified and that publication of evaluation of professor was not
libelous), aff'd, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987) with Clark v. McBaine, 252 S.W. 428
(Mo. 1923) (holding statement that professor's dismissal was justified because
he was unfit to teach on law school faculty constituted libel).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
49. For a discussion of jurisdictions supporting this approach, see infra
notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
50. Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984). The court held that
"[b]ecause [the plaintiff] failed to identify a single person who received or read
the report outside the University . . . [the plaintiff] failed to meet her burden of
proving publication." Id. at 989.
51. Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1276-77 (M.D.
Pa. 1976) (noting such communications were privileged and made without
malice).
52. Walter v. Davidson, 104 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 1958). The court held that
statements made within the hearing of another sharing similar authority "are the
legal equivalent of speaking only to one's self and are not publications." Id. at
116.
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Thus, in many jurisdictions, statements made orally or in
writing to a committee composed of other employees of the insti-
tution constitute internal communications, not publications. The
subject of the committee's deliberations is therefore precluded
from establishing a prima facie case of defamation, unless there
was some other form of publication. Under this definition, an in-
stitution's sending of an investigation report to a federal agency
would also constitute an internal communication. Federal regula-
tions require the submission of a report, and agencies maintain
the confidentiality of their misconduct cases unless and until a
formal finding of misconduct is made. 53 Thus, the filing of an
investigation report would not constitute a publication. In some
states, however, only one other person besides the alleged de-
famer must be present for publication to occur; in such a jurisdic-
tion the submission of an investigation report to the NSF or the
PHS could establish the publication element for a prima facie case
of defamation.
54
Another component of the prima facie case of defamation is
the defendant's intent to defame. 55 The standard used to deter-
mine intent varies depending on the status of the plaintiff and
whether the matter is one of public concern. 56 To demonstrate
intent, public officials and figures must demonstrate a higher de-
gree of fault than private individuals, referred to as "actual mal-
ice." 57 Actual malice is defined as making a statement with
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."58 In contrast, private figures, to prove intent,
need only show that statements were made negligently, that is,
with a "want of reasonable care and diligence to ascertain the
truth." 59
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 689.4 (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 50.103 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Brewer v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir.
1980) (finding that Kentucky "implicitly assumes that communications from one
supervisor to another or to a secretary are publications"); accord Elbeshbeshy v.
Franklin Inst., 618 F. Supp. 170, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (communication to one
other person, even if that other person is defamer's agent, constitutes publica-
tion) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577, cmt. c (1977)).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme
Court requires plaintiffs who are public figures to meet a higher burden of proof
of actual malice-demonstrating knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth-instead of mere negligence on the part of the defamer. Id. at 279-80.
Pennsylvania's defamation statute does not explicitly address the private/public
plaintiff distinction. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(a) (1982).
57. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
58. Id. at 280.
59. Rutt v. Bethlehem's Globe Pub. Co., 484 A.2d 72, 83 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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Plaintiffs also bear an increased burden of proof if the alleged
defamation relates to a matter of public concern or interest.60
The status of a statement is determined by its "content, form and
context." 6 1 The statements of misconduct committees evaluating
certain research practices of one scientist or laboratory would
often not be a matter of public concern requiring the higher stan-
dard. 62 While misconduct in science can be viewed as a misuse of
public funds because they are federal grant funds, only in rela-
tively rare circumstances, such as with a subject who was already
publicly known, or misconduct that affected public health or
safety, would such misconduct be held a matter of public concern.
1981) (confirming that, when matter is not of public concern, private citizen
plaintiff must establish only negligence in regard to falsity).
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court noted that people can become public
figures voluntarily if they "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved... [and]
invite attention and comment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974).
Scientists can be public figures. For example, Linus Pauling, a Nobel prize
winning research scientist, was considered to be a public figure for defamation
purposes when he led an international movement to stop nuclear bomb testing.
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188, 197 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 909 (1967). In Pauling, the court noted that the plaintiff, "by his
public statements and actions, was projecting himself into the arena of public
controversy and into the very 'vortex of the discussion of a question of pressing
public concern,' " and therefore was required to prove "actual malice". Id. at
195. It is the issue raised by the statement, not the position of the plaintiff,
which determines if a person is a public figure. Johnson v. Board ofJunior Col-
lege Dist. #508, 334 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. 323).
In Johnson, several junior college professors were classified as public figures
when they became involved in a local controversy over their alleged failure to
use textbooks written by racial minorities. Id. at 447. The court concluded that
"while... not public figures for all purposes, plaintiffs clearly had become pub-
lic figures within the ... College Community, which was the community served
by the publication." Id. at 447; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111,
135 (1979) (holding that receipt of public research grants did not make director
of research at state mental hospital public figure in regards to content of studies,
as director "did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influ-
ence others").
60. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that questionnaire cir-
culated among assistant district attorneys concerning office morale was not mat-
ter of public concern, as questions did not suggest wrongdoing on part of
District Attorney, but rather discontent among employees). In Pennsylvania, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that the subject matter is one of public
concern. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b) (1982).
61. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
62. But cf Chonich v. Ford, 321 N.W.2d 693, 697 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding statements about alleged misuse of millions of dollars of college funds
by defendant, chairman of board of trustees of county community college was
"matter[] of public concern in regard to which .. .[defendants] should be al-
lowed to express their views . . .without fear of repercussions," and as such
absolutely privileged).
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After establishing a prima facie case by demonstrating that
the defendant published false statements of fact with the requisite
level of intent, the plaintiff may have to contend with several de-
fenses, such as truth, fair comment (also known as the opinion
doctrine), and various privileges and immunities. 63 The most
complete defense to a defamation suit is truth, but this defense is
rarely used because it is difficult to prove that a statement is abso-
lutely true. A review of recent Pennsylvania case law reveals no
cases in which a court held for the defendant on the grounds that
the statement proved to be true.
64
A. Fair Comment Doctrine
The second defense to a defamation suit is the "fair comment
doctrine," which provides constitutional protection for expres-
sions of opinions. 65 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme
Court established a First Amendment presumption that there is
no such thing as a false idea, and therefore opinions are abso-
lutely immune from defamation actions.
66
In the aftermath of Gertz, courts have struggled to distinguish
between facts and opinions. Some courts have stated that verifia-
ble statements are facts, while those that are not verifiable are
opinions.67 Professors Prosser and Keeton have suggested three
types of defamatory opinions: "deductive opinions," in which the
publisher implies misconduct on the basis of true information;
"evaluative opinions," in which the publisher passes judgment on
63. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b) (1982). For a discussion of
each of these defenses, see infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
64. For example, in U.S. Heahhcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990), the court referred to truth as a defense,
but it ambiguously cited a Pennsylvania case, Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., that placed the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff. U.S. Healthcare,
898 F.2d at 923 (citing Dunlop v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982)).
65. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) ("Under the First
Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea."). This principle was set
forth in dicta, but lower courts have since accepted it as law. See, e.g., Olman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Gertz elevated to constitutional
principal the distinction between fact and opinion, which at common law had
formed the basis of the doctrine of fair comment.").
66. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. In Gertz, the Court stated that "[h]owever
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries, but on the compilation of other ideas." Id.
67. See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (noting that con-
text of assertion may give rise to liability if underlying facts are implied, but that
"[a]n assertion that cannot be proved false cannot be held libelous").
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one's conduct (actionable only if the publisher does not believe
the opinion or believed it unreasonably); and "informational
opinions," which imply underlying facts known to the publisher
(actionable if no such facts exist).
68
In Oilman v. Evans, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit developed a four-part test to distin-
guish fact from opinion, examining: (1) the common usage or
meaning of the specific language of the challenged statement to
determine if that language has precise meaning; (2) the ver-
ifiability of the statement; (3) the full context of the statement;
and (4) the broader context in which the statement appears. 69 In
the tenure evaluation context, courts have dismissed or disposed
of cases at the summary judgment stage because the statements of
committee members were found to be opinion.
70
The fair comment doctrine is often used by courts in their
evaluations of defamation actions arising from decisions to deny
academic promotions or tenure. 71 For example, in Belliveau v.
Renick, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that an eval-
uation by a department chairperson recommending against plain-
tiff's promotion was not actionable as defamation, because it was
based on a difference in opinion between the department chair
and the professor on what constituted publishing experience.72
Similarly, in Baker v. Lafayette College, Baker, a college art pro-
fessor in Pennsylvania, who was not reappointed at the end of his
68. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 113A, at 813-14 (5th ed. 1984).
69. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court felt
that readers would be "less likely to infer facts from an indefinite or ambiguous
statement than one with a commonly understood meaning." Id.
70. See, e.g., McConnell v. Howard Univ., 621 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1985),
aft'd, 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (granting summary judgment when university
officials charged plaintiff with "neglect," as "neglect" is opinion, not false state-
ment of fact); Baker v. Lafayette College, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987) (affirming
dismissal of action concerning statements made by professor in evaluation of
plaintiff that were directed to provost); Belliveau v. Rerick, 504 A.2d 1360 (R.I.
1986) (affirming summary judgment when opinion was based on facts supplied
by plaintiff); Byars v. Kolodziej, 363 N.E.2d 628 (I11. App. Ct. 1977) (affirming
dismissal on grounds that statements on plaintiff's qualifications for tenure were
opinion); Gernander v. Winona State Univ., 428 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (affirming summary judgment when writing style and intended audience
of memo supported interpretation that it was opinion).
71. See, e.g., Colson v. Stieg, 433 N.E.2d 246 (I1. 1982) (rule of fair com-
ment on matters of public concern applied to allegedly defamatory comments
made during personnel committee meeting regarding tenure decision); Belliveau,
504 A.2d at 1360.
72. Belliveau, 504 A.2d at 1360.
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term, sued the college for defamation. 73 The claim was based on
a report written by the dean of another art school who was asked
by Lafayette College to evaluate Baker by examining the work of
his students.74 The court found that the report contained two
types of statements, opinion and fact. 75 The court held that the
evaluation portion, which contained a recommendation not to re-
hire Baker, was opinion, and therefore not actionable.
76
In McConnell v. Howard University, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that statements by univer-
sity personnel to the effect that actions indisputably taken by the
plaintiff constituted a neglect of his professional duties were
"evaluative opinions." 77 The court said that such opinions would
be actionable only if the personnel "did not entertain the opinion
expressed and [were] misstating [their] own state[s] of mind or if
a reasonable and fair-minded person could not have entertained
the derogatory opinion on the basis of the information on which
[they] relied." 7
8
In light of these cases, misconduct committee members'
statements could be held to consist in whole or in part of opinion,
entitling them to some protection under the opinion doctrine.79
Alternatively, the findings of the misconduct committee could be
held to contain both fact and opinion, and therefore warrant
some protection under the opinion doctrine. 80
Finally, a misconduct committee's recommendations could
also be protected if considered "evaluative opinions," that is,
73. Baker v. Lafayette College, 504 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), aff'd,
532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987).
74. Id. at 248. Two other letters by the art department head were privi-
leged because the plaintiff consented to their publication. Id. at 249. Addition-
ally, a nonprivileged memo was found to lack defamatory meaning and,
therefore, was not actionable. Id. at 250-56.
75. Id. at 252.
76. Id. The court held that the factual statements contained in the report
were "incapable of a defamatory meaning" and therefore were also not actiona-
ble. Id.
77. McConnell v. Howard Univ., 621 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.D.C. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 1 13A,
at 814). McConnell involved a professor who was dismissed from a tenured posi-
tion for refusing to teach until a student apologized for calling him a racist. Id.
at 328.
78. Id. at 332 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 113A, at 814).
79. See, e.g., Belliveau v. Renick, 504 A.2d 1360 (R.I. 1986). For a discus-
sion of Belliveau, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Baker v. Lafayette College, 504 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986),
aff'd, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987). For a discussion of Baker, see supra notes 73-76
and accompanying text. See also infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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evaluations based on facts, actionable only if the defendant did
not entertain the opinion expressed or if a reasonable and fair-
minded person could not have found misconduct based on the
data the person examined. 8'
While most misconduct committee evaluations likely will
contain some form of opinion, courts may consider portions of
the reports actionable statements of fact. The committees' evalu-
ations are less "purely subjective" than the statements discussed
in the tenure cases above because part of the committees' goal is
to establish objective truth with regard to the factual elements of
the allegations. The misconduct committees then proceed to
evaluate the facts to arrive at an opinion about whether those
facts constitute misconduct in science. In contrast, tenure com-
mittee decisions are based almost entirely on subjective elements,
such as how well a professor will work with other department
members, or whether the department will benefit from the profes-
sor's abilities. Therefore, although the factual conclusions of mis-
conduct committees in establishing the objective truth may be
actionable, the conclusions regarding misconduct should not be.
B. Absolute Privilege
Privilege, sometimes called immunity, is a third defense to a
defamation claim.8 2 "Privilege" refers to otherwise actionable
conduct that escapes liability because "the defendant is acting in
furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is enti-
tled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to
the plaintiff's reputation."8 3 There are two types of privileges:
absolute and qualified. 84
Absolute privilege protects the speaker regardless of what
the speaker says in the few situations in which policy considera-
tions favor complete freedom of expression, regardless of mo-
tive. 85 The most common absolute immunity is accorded to
81. See, e.g., McConnell, 621 F. Supp. at 327. Misconduct committee evalua-
tions may be based on information such as notebooks or other research records,
some of which the individuals accused of misconduct may have provided to the
committee. In such a case, the data or other information provided to the com-
mittee, although it might ultimately prove to be untrue, could constitute nonac-
tionable "fact" because it was supplied by the plaintiff.
82. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b)(2) (1982).
83. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 114, at 815. Some courts limit privilege
to when a defendant may speak with immunity, but the terms do not differ in
principle and therefore are used interchangeably.
84. Id. §§ 114-15.
85. Id. § 114.
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certain individuals involved in the judicial process, such as judges,
jurors and prosecutors. 86 Since the late 1800s courts have agreed
that a judicial officer, even when acting maliciously, corruptly, or
in excess of jurisdiction, is immune from civil suit for acts com-
mitted in the course of the judicial officer's duties. 87 The ration-
ale for this immunity is that "a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own con-
victions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself."88
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Stump v. Sparkman that
the question in deciding whether to grant absolute immunity to a
judge was whether the judge was acting within his jurisdiction,
and not whether or not his activity was a "judicial" act. 89 That
same year, in Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court extended abso-
lute immunity to an Executive Branch administrative law judge,
holding that it is the nature of the judgments and not the location
of the judges within a particular branch of government that gives
rise to absolute immunity. 90 The Court held that the judge was
not disqualified from absolute immunity because of his status as
an executive branch employee.9'
In Cleavinger v. Saxner, the Court set out several factors used
to determine whether a function is sufficiently judicial to receive
the absolute privilege. 92 These factors are:
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his
86. Id.
87. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-11 (1978) (recounting history
of law of providing absolute immunity for judges, federal prosecutors, state
prosecutors and jurors).
88. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871)).
89. Id. at 357, 360. The Court held that a county circuit court judge who
cursorily approved a parent's petition for a minor's sterilization was absolutely
protected from liability in an action by the sterilized woman for violation of her
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 364. The Court held that the judge
was "immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in
error." Id.
90. Butz, 438 U.S. at 514. The Court explained that "the cluster of immuni-
ties protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the
characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location." Id. at 512.
91. Id. at 514.
92. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). Cleavinger dealt with a suit
by prisoners against prison officials for violation of various constitutional rights.
Id. at 198. Three prisoners were found guilty by the prison's discipline commit-
tee of encouraging work stoppages. Id. at 194-95. Those findings were the basis
of the plaintiffs' suits. Id. at 198. The Court held that the prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 206.
19921 1379
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functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the
presence of safeguards [other than potential liability]
that reduce the need for private damages actions as a
means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insu-
lation from political influence; (d) the importance of pre-
cedent; (e) the adversary nature of the [agency] process;
and (0 the correctability of error on appeal. 93
After analyzing the facts of Butz, the Court in Cleavinger concluded
that adjudication within a federal administrative agency had
enough characteristics of the judicial process so that those in-
volved in such adjudication should be granted qualified immunity
from suits for damages. 94
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to grant absolute im-
munity to nonjudicial bodies with quasi-judicial functions. In
Cleavinger, the Court found that officials who served on the Insti-
tution Discipline Committee (that hears cases against inmates for
rules infractions) of a federal prison were entitled only to quali-
fied immunity. 95 The Court analogized the decisions of the
prison discipline committee to those of school board committees,
and emphasized that the latter receive only qualified immunity. 96
The Court reasoned that the operation of the prison discipline
committee was less formal than the federal administrative pro-
ceeding that warranted absolute immunity in Butz. 97 In addition,
the prison committee's members were not independent, profes-
sional, hearing officers, but rather prison officials serving outside
their regular duties.98 Furthermore, the procedural safeguards
applied in Butz were not present in Cleavinger: prisoners were
neither afforded lawyers nor independent nonstaff representa-
tives; prisoners had no right to compel witness attendance, cross-
examination, or discovery; no verbatim transcript was kept; and
the information presented was often hearsay. 99 The Court held
that the combined effect of these factors demonstrated that the
93. Id. at 202 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
94. Id. at 206. The Court acknowledged that the line between qualified and
absolute immunity is not always an easy one to draw. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court compared the regulatory nature of the decisions made by
the two types of boards and concluded that they both deserved only qualified
immunity. Id.
97. Id. at 203-04. In Butz, the Court held that the special functions of some
executive officials within the Department of Agriculture warranted absolute im-
munity from liability. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508.
98. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 206.
99. Id. The Court concluded that the committee members were not truly
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prison hearing committee members were not "independent" and
thus not entitled to absolute immunity.' 00
The Supreme Court's holding in Cleavinger has been distin-
guished by some federal courts. 101 In Shelly v. Johnson, the District
Court for the Western District of Michigan held that a Michigan
prison hearing officer was entitled to absolute immunity from lia-
bility for his or her quasi-judicial acts because such immunity was
"essential to preserve the independence which judicial and quasi-
judicial officers must enjoy to properly discharge their duties."' 10 2
The Shelly court distinguished Cleavinger on several grounds.
First, the court addressed the professional nature of the Michigan
hearing officers. 03 The court noted that unlike the discipline
committee members in Cleavinger who served on an ad hoc basis,
the Michigan prison hearing officers served in a statutorily de-
fined official position, in a full-time capacity. 0 4 The function of
the Michigan hearing officers was more clearly adjudicatory than
the officers in Cleavinger because, pursuant to statute, the officers
must be attorneys, testimony must be heard, and facts must be
found and issued in writing. 10 5
In another departure from Cleavinger, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Nebraska granted absolute immunity
to members of a state prison disciplinary committee appeals
board, which had upheld sanctions against an inmate for rules in-
fractions.' 0 6 In Shaddy v. Gunter, the court distinguished the posi-
tion and function of the appeals board members from those of the
Cleavinger officials.' 0 7 The main difference the court noted was
that the Nebraska officials served on the appeals board as a regu-
lar function and, thus, were more independent than the commit-
independent and stated that "the members had no identification with the judi-
cial process of the kind and depth that has occasioned absolute immunity." Id.
100. Id.
101. See Shaddy v. Gunter, 690 F. Supp. 860 (D. Neb. 1988); Shelly v. John-
son, 684 F. Supp. 941, 944 (W.D. Mich. 1987), aft'd, 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.
1988); see also McCutcheon v. Moran, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Baker v. Lafayette College, 504 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
102. Shelly, 684 F. Supp. at 943.
103. Id. The court noted that "unlike the members of the discipline com-
mittee in Cleavinger, the Michigan prison hearing officer is an attorney especially
appointed to conduct prison disciplinary hearings as a full time judicial officer."
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The court held that the role of the Michigan prison hearing officer
is "similar to that of an administrative law judge and as such should be entitled
to absolute judicial immunity .... " Id.
106. Shaddy, 690 F. Supp. at 865.
107. Id. at 864-65.
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tee members in Cleavinger who were forced to choose between
their superior, the warden, and the prisoners.108
In McCutcheon v. Moran, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld
a grant of absolute immunity to ajanitor's statement at the school
board hearing concerning a teacher accused of battery by that
janitor, holding that the school board was functioning as a "quasi-
judicial body."' 0 9 The court held that the janitor's statement to
the school board was absolutely privileged because the board's
proceedings could "be regarded as judicial in nature," and be-
cause the board had "powers of discretion in applying the law to
the facts."'' 0
Based on an application of this analysis, misconduct in sci-
ence review committee members may well be accorded absolute
immunity. As discussed above, these misconduct investigations
are undertaken by sponsoring research institutions pursuant to
the requirements of the federal granting agencies' regulations,
under procedures that are subject to annual submission to and
review by the PHS. The existence of these established proce-
dures, under the aegis of the federal regulations, should lead to
the granting of absolute immunity under the principles set forth
in Butz.' Institutional committees proceed with investigations
of allegations of misconduct in science only after the federal gov-
ernment has "deferred" to them; in every case, the federal agen-
cies could choose to proceed with the investigation themselves."l 2
Thus, even misconduct in science committees at private institu-
tions are closely allied with the federal government and their ac-
tions in that context are clearly "judicial in nature."
Furthermore, according to general institutional procedures, mis-
conduct committee members should not serve if they have con-
flicts of interest, a factor that provides for the independence that
was absent in Cleavinger."l3
108. Id. at 865.
109. McCutcheon v. Moran, 425 N.E.2d at 1130, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
110. Id. at 1133.
111. For a discussion of the Butz principles, see supra notes 90-94 and ac-
companying text.
112. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(a) (1992). For a discussion of this regula-
tion, see supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, PROCE-
DURES FOR DEALING WITH ISSUES OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, in FACULTY POL-
ICIES HANDBOOK 15, 19 (1990) (stating that investigation is conducted by ad hoc
committee comprised of disinterested members of Standing Committee on Disci-
pline and other appropriate faculty members). For a discussion of Cleavinger, see
supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
1382 [Vol. 37: p. 1361
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/3
MISCONDUCT IN SCIENCE
On the other hand, serving on a misconduct in science com-
mittee generally is not a regular function of institution employ-
ees. Members of the committee may be coworkers of both the
accused scientist and the institution. This "independence" prob-
lem could be rectified by insuring that no committee members
have conflicts of interest or by adding "service to a misconduct
committee" to position descriptions of scientists at institutions.
With these added safeguards, institutional committee members
should be completely immune from civil suits under the Michigan
court's analysis in Shelly.
Another way in which the activity of committee members may
be absolutely privileged is through the doctrine of consent by the
subject scientist to misconduct investigations. In Baker v. Lafayette
College, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that comments on a
professor's qualifications by a fellow art professor were absolutely
privileged because by signing his employment contract, the em-
ployee agreed to submit to regular evaluations by his col-
leagues. 14 The court also indicated that comments by a
professor at another art school might be protected by an absolute
privilege under a consent theory, when the school's published
procedures explicitly permitted the solicitation of advice from
outsiders.115 Under this analysis, if an institution's policies, which
the subject is required to read before accepting employment,
mention the participation of fellow employees and outside ex-
perts in misconduct review, the institution's misconduct commit-
tee members could be protected by an absolute privilege.
C. Qualified or Conditional Privilege
Under some circumstances, a court may find that although
the defendant did not have an absolute privilege, the defendant's
statement deserved protection; in such case, the notion of quali-
114. Baker v. Lafayette College, 504 A.2d 247, 249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986),
aff'd, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987).
115. Id. at 251. The court in Baker held that the report by a dean of another
art school to the provost at the plaintiff's school was not covered by the absolute
privilege of consent because there was some question as to whether the report
was within the scope of consent the plaintiff originally gave when he signed his
employment contract, and whether the consent was revoked by the plaintiff
before the report was issued. Id. The issue was moot in this case, as the court
ruled that the report was not capable of defamatory meaning. Id. The court
dismissed the scope of consent issue in dicta. The court indicated that it might
have awarded the report an absolute privilege if other factors had not been pres-
ent, including that the report from the outsider was obtained after the decision
not to reappoint the plaintiff had been made. Id.
1992] 1383
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fled privilege is applied."16 Historically, a qualified privilege ex-
isted when the defendant sought to vindicate an interest
sufficiently important to justify some latitude for making mistakes.
Unlike an absolute privilege, however, a qualified privilege can be
lost through abuse or bad faith publication." 17
In Pennsylvania, a qualified privilege arises if two criteria are
met. First, the statement must be made in good faith.'"I Second,
the statement must involve one of the following interests: (1) an
interest of the person who publishes defamatory matter; (2) an
interest of the person to whom the matter is published or some
other third person; or (3) a recognized public interest." 9 The
general rule in the tenure review context is that an evaluating offi-
cial who makes a "good faith substantiated judgment that a
faculty or staff member does not merit reappointment, promotion
or the award of tenure or permanent employment" is protected
116. See, e.g., Smith v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 558, 562 (W.D.
Pa. 1984), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1139 (1986) (holding that discussion between various
employees, managers and union representatives constituted conditionally privi-
leged occasion because they had legitimate interest in proceedings that con-
cerned money shortage and plaintiff's impending discharge).
117. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 115, at 825. "In all . . . cases, the
privilege is lost if [the publisher] says more than reasonably appears to be neces-
sary, or if the publication is made to a person who apparently is in no position to
give legitimate assistance ... ." Id. at 826.
118. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined the good faith require-
ment as follows:
[A] privileged communication is one made upon a proper occasion,
from a proper motive, in a proper manner and based upon reasonable
and probable cause, . . . and it is always for the court to determine
whether the alleged defamatory publication is thus privileged; if found
so to be, and if there is no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of malice, it is
the duty of the court to direct a nonsuit or give binding instructions for
the defendant.
Dempsky v. Double, 126 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. 1956) (citations omitted); see also
Burns v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 154, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Baird
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 1956); Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d
583, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
119. Burns, 615 F. Supp. at 158; Beckman, 419 A.2d at 588. In contrast,
Prosser and Keeton list five interests that give rise to a qualified privilege: inter-
est of the publisher; interest of others (for instance an employer's interest); com-
mon interest; communication to one who may act in the public interest; and fair
comment on matters of public concern. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 115, at
825-832. In practical terms, these categories create privileges under the same
circumstances as do Pennsylvania's laws. Thus, while Pennsylvania does not ex-
plicitly mention common interest, its three categories implicitly include what
this Article and Prosser and Keeton refer to as "common interest."
Although other states define the parameters of the privilege differently, the
effect is the same. For example, Michigan recognizes as privileged "all bona fide
communications concerning any subject matter in which a party has an interest
or duty owed to a person sharing a corresponding interest or duty."
Rosenboom v. Vanek, 451 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
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from a defamation suit by the qualified privilege doctrine. 20
Whether a misconduct committee member can likewise bene-
fit from the qualified privilege doctrine largely depends upon
what interest is at stake and what duty the member owes to the
public. The committee member may be granted a qualified privi-
lege when (1) there is a common interest in the subject matter of
the statement between the committee member and the recipient
of the information; (2) there is a sufficient third-party interest in
the committee member's statement; and (3) the committee mem-
ber had a duty to disclose the information to the public.
A qualified privilege arises when the publisher and the recipi-
ent have a common interest in the subject matter of the statement
and the context is one in which the statement is designed to fur-
ther that interest. 12' The existence of an employer-employee
qualified privilege also depends on the particular circumstances
of the alleged defamation. For example, a qualified privilege ex-
isted when an employer informed the employee's fellow workers
that the employee had been discharged for violating the rules
against sexual harassment. 22 The court reasoned that the em-
ployer and the other employees had a common interest in under-
standing the definition of sexual harassment and company rules
so as to avoid future violations. 23
Qualified privilege was applied in the academic context as
120. Francis T. Bazluke, Defamation Issues in Higher Education, NACUA
11 (1990). The standard for applying the qualified privilege doctrine in the ten-
ure review context parallels the standard applied in Pennsylvania and suggested
by Prosser and Keeton. Many courts shield performance evaluations from defa-
mation suits if (1) the evaluation is undertaken by the appropriate university
official, as prescribed by established procedures or customary practice; (2) com-
munications in the evaluation are relevant to the employment issue under re-
view; and (3) the evaluation is conveyed only to persons with a legitimate
interest in or duty regarding the subject matter. Id.
121. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 115, at 828. Prosser and Keeton note
that a common interest most often arises "in the case of those who entered upon
or are considering business dealings with one another, or where the parties are
members of a group with a common pecuniary interest." Id.
122. Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 387 (5th
Cir. 1987). The case involved a libel and slander action against Du Pont by an
employee who had been discharged for sexual harassment. Id. at 382-84. The
contested communication was a bulletin defining the company's sexual harass-
ment policy, which did not mention the employee by name. Id. The bulletin
referred to "[t]he recent sexual harassment incident which resulted in an em-
ployee's termination." Id. at 384.
123. Id. at 392. The court found that once a common interest was estab-
lished, a presumption of good faith arose. Id. at 388. In this case, the employee
did not have sufficient evidence of malice or bad faith to overcome this presump-
tion. Id. at 389-94.
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early as 1923, when the Missouri Supreme Court held that state-
ments by law school professors regarding the dismissal of another
professor were privileged. 12 4 In Clark v. McBaine, a law school
professor attempted to have the university's president fired by
writing letters critical of him to the local newspaper. 25 Other
professors, who were the defendants in the case, responded by
writing a letter, which they sent to a local newspaper and various
private individuals, stating that it was their belief, based on facts
known to them, that the plaintiff had been dismissed because he
"had ceased to be a useful member of the faculty."'126 The court
held that the entire faculty, including the defendants, had a com-
mon interest in the matter, and that the public had a right to ex-
pect that they would not remain passive on the subject.' 27 In
1989, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the continuing va-
lidity of qualified privilege in the academic context. 28 In Staheli
v. Smith, the court noted in dicta that a university dean's com-
ments regarding the dismissal of a faculty member to that mem-
ber's fellow employees were not actionable because of the dean's
"qualified privilege in the employment context."' 2 9
The only federal case that explicitly applied a privilege of
common interest in employment to the university setting and
held that as a result of the privilege the defamation claim fails was
Greenya v. George Washington University.' 30 In Greenya, a part-time
instructor who had been fired alleged civil rights violations and
defamation by the university and its officials. ' 3' The alleged defa-
mation was the statement "Do Not Staff" on an index card in the
office of academic staffing that had been prepared at the direction
of one of the defendants, the chairman of the English depart-
124. Clark v. McBaine, 252 S.W. 428 (Mo. 1923).
125. Id. at 430-31.
126. Id. at 431.
127. Id. at 432.
128. See Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299 (Miss. 1989).
129. Id. at 1305. The court applied Mississippi's qualified privilege stan-
dard to the tenure review context, stating that "a qualified privilege exists be-
tween those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice
no cause or action lies." Id. at 1305 (citations omitted) (quoting Hooks v. Mc-
Cull, 272 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1973).
However, the court ultimately held that the trial court properly granted
summary judgment on the governmental immunity issue. Id. at 1306. Evidence
showed that the dean acted within the scope of his position, which was analo-
gous to that of an employee. Id.
130. 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975).
131. Id. at 558.
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ment. l32 According to the plaintiff, the existence of the card con-
stituted defamation because it carried "an innuendo of either
incompetence or dishonesty."'' 3 3 The D.C. Circuit Court opinion
upheld the directed verdict in favor of the defendants on the
grounds that a qualified privilege existed between officers and
faculty members of educational organizations to discuss the quali-
fications and character of fellow officers and faculty members. 3 4
A recent Maine decision, in accord with Greenya, granted a
tenure committee professor a conditional privilege against a slan-
der claim.' 3 5 In Gautschi v. Maisel, Maisel, one of the defendants,
told the committee that one of Gautschi's referees had admitted
to Maisel that the positive reference he had given Gautschi was
false.' 3 6 The court held that Maisel's service as a college em-
ployee entitled him to a conditional privilege against slander
claims.' 3 7 The limited privilege required that Maisel be engaged
in an activity of benefit to his employer. The court held that re-
viewing another employee's credentials constituted an activity
beneficial to one's employer.' 38
Courts have applied the concept of "common interest in sub-
ject matter" often in the evaluation of educators. 3 9 In McGowen
v. Prentice, a communication from a principal to a school board
regarding the performance of a teacher was held protected by a
qualified privilege because school officials had a "lawful interest
... in the subject matter" on which the principal reported. 40
132. Id. at 563.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Gautschi v. Maisel, 565 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Me. 1989).
136. Id. at 1010-11.
137. Id. at 1011.
138. Id. The court stated: "This conditional privilege entitled Maisel to im-
munity for slander unless he abused the privilege - for example by making the
statement outside normal channels or with malicious intent." Id. Other courts
recognize this conditional privilege when one employee reviews another em-
ployee's credentials to determine the grant of permanent employment. See
Greenya, 512 F.2d at 563.
139. See, e.g., McGowen v. Prentice, 341 So. 2d 55, 57 (La. Ct. App. 1976)
(supplemental op., Prentice v. McGowen, 346 So. 2d 1361 (La. Ct. App. 1977)).
140. Id. at 57. The alleged defamation was a letter that firmly recom-
mended termination based on circumstances known to the principal. Id. This
letter was written in response to a request by the superintendent of the school
district who solicited defendant's recommendations regarding plaintiff's em-
ployment. Id.
The plaintiff in McGowen also argued that the principal's comment about the
plaintiff to another teacher was defamatory. Id. The principal stated: "[Tihat's
why you understand her so well, because you all are both nuts." Id. The court
held that this did not constitute actionable defamation. Id. at 57-58.
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The common interest the principal shared with the school board
was the desire to choose the most qualified teachers for the public
schools. 141
Qualified privilege does not require the publisher to be an
employee of the person to whom the communication was pub-
lished. 42 For example, in Buckley v. Litman, the person to whom
the negative evaluation was published was contemplating hiring
the plaintiff.143 Additionally, a duty establishing a privilege can
be created by general institutional policies, published or unpub-
lished, prohibiting the conduct in question. For instance, one
case involved a university policy encouraging employees and stu-
dents to report sexual assaults.144 A woman reported an assault,
and in the process allegedly destroyed the plaintiff's reputa-
tion. 145 She was held to have a qualified privilege in reporting the
assault, even though she reported it to an inappropriate per-
son. 146 The court acknowledged that while a strict interpretation
of university policy might indicate that the defendant should have
contacted the university's affirmative action office or her supervi-
sor, her report should not be disregarded in light of the institu-
tion's policy encouraging all students and employees to report
instances of sexual assault. 147
Members of misconduct committees will almost certainly be
given the same common interest qualified privilege as is given
faculty members serving on tenure review committees. Institu-
tions benefit as much from research misconduct investigations as
they do from review of tenure qualifications. Specifically, most
universities depend on federal funds for a large portion of their
science and engineering research budget, and investigating mis-
conduct in science is required by the regulations of many grantor
agencies. 148 Hence, the efficiency and reputation of an institution
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Buckley v. Litman, 443 N.E.2d. 469 (N.Y. 1982) (involving
publication by doctor to another doctor with whom he had continuing relation-
ship of information about plaintiff in whom both had common'interest was con-
ditionally privileged).
143. Id. at 470. In fact, negotiations to run a family practice clinic were
complete at the time the defendant sent the letter concerning plaintiff's criminal
behavior. Id. at 470.
144. Rosenboom v. Vanek, 451 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. Defendant reported the assault to the plaintiff's supervisor instead
of to the university's affirmative action office or her own supervisor.
147. Id.
148. Federal research and development expenditures accounted for 60 per-
cent of total fiscal year 1989 scientific and engineering expenditures at universi-
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are common interests because these interests dictate whether that
institution will receive funding. Courts are likely to consider the
misconduct committee members' activities as beneficial to an in-
stitution. These activities are very important to an institution's
reputation because they can help it to discover and eliminate any
misconduct occurring under its auspices.
Furthermore, an employee's desire to avoid termination is an
additional interest giving rise to a common interest privilege for
the employer to communicate what behavior will warrant termi-
nation.149 Likewise, the subject matter of misconduct committees
should carry with it a qualified privilege for a similar reason: By
serving on committees, members will learn how to carefully docu-
ment their research in a way that will avoid even the appearance
of misconduct in their future research behavior. 1
50
A common interest may also arise out of a relationship be-
tween fellow employees. 151 Even if the committee members' eval-
uations were inaccurate, they may likely be entitled to a qualified
privilege because of this relationship. For instance, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court held that a communication between a pro-
fessor and the vice president of academic administration
regarding proposed faculty promotions within his department
was privileged by virtue of the relationship among the faculty
members. 152 Other kinds of "common interest" have been found
between a general contractor and an employee supervising a sub-
contractor, and also between law schools and the Educational
Testing Service, a company that administers the Law School Ad-
ties and colleges. MARGE MACHEN, SELECTED DATA ON ACADEMIC
SCIENCE/ENGINEERING R&D EXPENDITURES FY 1989, NSF 90-321 (National Sci-
ence Foundation 1991).
149. Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 386 (5th
Cir. 1987).
150. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Staheli v. Smith referred to the quali-
fied privilege as existing "within the employment context." Staheli v. Smith,
548 So. 2d 1299, 1305 (Miss. 1989). One possible requirement for common
interest qualified privilege remains untested: courts may require that the person
sitting on the committee be an official employee of the institution in order to
receive qualified immunity, not an expert recruited to voluntarily serve on the
committee. Id.
151. The three categories of qualified privileges in Pennsylvania would in-
clude this privilege. For a discussion of these categories, see supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
152. Belliveau v. Renick, 504 A.2d 1360, 1363 (R.I. 1986). Such a relation-
ship required the defendant to "comment frankly upon the merits of applicants
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missions Test (LSAT) exam.' 53 If these relationships entail a
common interest privilege, so too will the relationships between
misconduct committee members and the sponsoring institutions.
The interest covered by a qualified privilege is not only a
''common" interest but may also be an interest of a third party
who receives the communication. A good example is an em-
ployer's interest in hiring honest and qualified people. 54 This
qualified privilege requires that the third party interest be an im-
portant interest; the publication to the recipient be within gener-
ally accepted standards of decent conduct; and the statements be
made in response to a request by the third party.' 55
The opinions of members of a misconduct committee satisfy
all three of these requirements: an important issue, the continu-
ing employment of the subject, exists; the members' ideas would
be solicited, probably by the institutions for which they were serv-
ing on a committee; and their forum would be the only forum for
misconduct investigations. Thus, the committee members should
be eligible for a qualified privilege to protect that interest.
The duty or interest need not be legal but may be moral or
social. 156 The Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly has recog-
nized a qualified privilege for false and defamatory statements of
fact in cases in which "the publisher acting in good faith correctly
or reasonably believes that he has a legal, moral, or social duty to
speak out."' 15 7 In Ponticelli v. Mine Safety Appliance Company, the
court granted a qualified privilege to the supervisor of a manufac-
turing unit, who stated as a reason for dismissing a plaintiff em-
ployee, possibly incorrectly, that the plaintiff employee had
falsified her production of records. 58 Even if scientists do not
have a legal responsibility to sit on committees at their institu-
153. Johnson v. Educational Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985) (holding that educational testing service's reports to
law school were protected by qualified privilege); Brewer v. American Nat'l Ins.
Co., 636 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that employee's statements were sub-
ject to qualified privilege).
154. See Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 243 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ill.
1968) (finding communication between former employer and potential em-
ployer regarding latter's inquiry about employment status of plaintiff condition-
ally privileged as matter of law).
155. Id. at 220.
156. Rosenboom v. Vanek, 451 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
The court stipulated that a qualified privilege extended to "any subject matter in
which a party has an interest or duty owed to a person sharing a corresponding
interest or duty." Id.
157. Ponticelli v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 247 A.2d 303, 305 (R.I. 1968).
158. Id. Such falsification was, however, denied by the employee. Id.
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tions, they could be perceived as having a moral or social duty to
promote the effective use of the public's tax dollars by preventing
fraud and misconduct in science, thereby entitling them to a qual-
ified privilege. 159
When a misconduct committee member satisfies the require-
ments necessary to gain a qualified privilege, this privilege may
still be lost. 160 A court may determine that the privilege was
abused through overbroad publication or malice.16 Additionally,
it is possible to lose a privilege through negligence. 162
Misconduct committee members would only benefit from a
qualified privilege if they did not abuse it. The publication of any
statements must not exceed the scope that was necessary.' 63 Ad-
ditionally, any malice or bad faith on the part of the publisher
would be an abuse of the privilege resulting in its termination.
Therefore, misconduct committee members would lose their
qualified privilege in the employment context if the "publication
occurred outside normal channels" or "if the normal manner of
handling such information resulted in an unreasonable degree of
publication in light of the purposes of the privilege."' 64
In Staheli v. Smith, the qualified privilege existed because con-
sideration of the case by the faculty senate was an established step
in the tenure review process.' 65 Thus, no publication "outside
the circle" occurred.' 66 This holding indicates that written publi-
cation procedures should be established for misconduct commit-
tees in order to define participation so that no question will arise
159. For a discussion of the scientific community's extensive reliance on
public funding, see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, at 832-35.
161. Id. at 832-33.
162. See Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). For a fur-
ther discussion of the negligence standard in Beckman, see infra notes 185-86 and
accompanying text.
163. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 115, at 832. Prosser and Keeton
state:
[Qjualified privilege does not extend.., to the publication of irrelevant
defamatory matter with no bearing upon the public or private interest
which is entitled to protection; nor does it include publication to any
person other than those whose hearing of it is reasonably believed to
be necessary or useful for the furtherance of that interest.
Id.
164. Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). In certain circumstances, such as when the de-
fendant does not know the proper channels for communication, this rule is not
strictly construed. For an example of such a situation, see supra notes 144-47
and accompanying text.
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about the scope and reasonableness of the publication. To en-
sure that the privilege would not be destroyed, committee mem-
bers could limit the publication of their written or oral comments
to other committee members or perhaps to other employees of
the institution. It may also be reasonable to limit publication of
the final report.'
67
False statements that injure a subject's reputation are pro-
tected by a qualified privilege so long as the statements are moti-
vated by good faith and not by malice.' 68 The privilege ceases if
the defendant "published the defamation in the wrong state of
mind."' 169 A Pennsylvania court, however, found no malice in a
case in which "publication may have been inspired in part, by re-
sentment or indignation at the conduct of the person de-
famed."' 70 In Ponnceli v. Demers, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that past disagreements between plaintiff and defend-
ant did not amount to actual malice.' 71 A shift supervisor re-
marked to the plaintiff's coworkers that the plaintiff had been
discharged for "pushing a pencil," which was the plant's vernacu-
167. For an explanation of institutional reporting requirements, see supra
notes 7-25 and accompanying text. Submitting a copy of the investigation re-
port to the NSF, the PHS or another federal agency is required by law, and there
is no reason to assert that such a submission would affect the privilege, but pub-
lication to other sources, such as the press or the subject's colleagues, should be
avoided if the privilege is to be sustained. Institutions could provide a further
level of protection to themselves and their committee members by requesting a
subpoena from the federal agency before transferring the investigative report.
168. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 115, at 833.
169. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, at 833-34. Courts differ on whether
malice constitutes an abuse of privilege that destroys the existence of the privi-
lege, or whether it is the varying element that makes the privilege qualified in
the first place instead of absolute. Compare Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 568 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) with Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). In either case, the result is liability for the publisher.
In a Pennsylvania case, the question of whether a defendant lost his privi-
lege by acting with malice survived the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment because the plaintiff "presented some evidence that plaintiff was
terminated for reasons of professional jealousy." Elbeshbeshy v. Franklin Inst.,
618 F. Supp. 170, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Although the court indicated that some
evidence proved termination for professional jealously, the court did not pro-
vide for any factual basis for its decision or cite to the record. Id.
170. Beckman, 419 A.2d at 588. This decision was based on the specific facts
presented. First, the opinions at issue were reached only after considerable ex-
posure to plaintiff's work. Id. Second, the information was disseminated for a
proper purpose. Id. Thus, although there may also have been a feeling of re-
sentment between plaintiff and defendant, this was insufficient to overcome the
other factors supporting a finding of a qualified privilege. Id.
171. Ponncelli v. Demers, 247 A.2d 303 (R.I. 1968). The court did not ac-
cord enough signifigance to these events to deny qualified immunity to the
defendant.
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lar for padding production figures. 1 72 The plaintiff alleged actual
malice by referring to an incident two years earlier between plain-
tiff and defendant in which the plaintiff went over the defendant's
head to request a transfer. 73 The plaintiff also claimed that the
defendant resented plaintiff's salary because it almost equalled
defendant's salary.' 74 The court upheld dismissal of the plain-
tiff's slander complaint on the grounds that, while a jury might
have inferred that the defendant was resentful towards the plain-
tiff, this does not lead to the conclusion that the defendant's pri-
mary motivation behind his conversation with her coworkers was
ill will.' 75 The court restated the rule for actual malice in Rhode
Island: When a conditional privilege of common interest exists,
the plaintiff must show that the primary motivating force for the
communication was the publisher's ill will or spite towards the
plaintiff.1
76
An allegation of bad faith by a committee member could oc-
cur in the misconduct arena. Professional jealousy undoubtedly
exists, and even professional competitiveness surfaces in different
forms, some of which could be interpreted as bad faith. Most
courts agree that to be eligible for a qualified privilege the state-
ments cannot be made with malice. 177 As indicated above, exactly
what constitutes malice or bad faith sufficient to lose the privilege
varies among jurisdictions. 78 In Mississippi, for example, the
termination "at will" of an employee,. telling him that he should
"watch his p's and q's" after he filed a grievance for sick leave,
and sequestering him during questioning were held not to indi-
cate actual malice or bad faith for determining whether a qualified
privilege existed. 1
79
172. Id. at 305. Plaintiff admitted this discrepancy; however, she claimed
she was not responsible for the inaccurate figures. Id.
173. Id. Plaintiff claimed that these incidents provided an evidentiary basis
from which the jury could have concluded that the defendant's actions were mo-
tivated by malice. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 309. The court held that "[t]he inferential possibilities consid-
ered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are susceptible to no more than
the conclusion that [defendant] may have derived an incidental gratification by
reason of the disclosure of plaintiff's diffictilties." Id.
176. Id. at 309.
177. See, e.g., Garziano v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th
Cir. 1987) (qualified privilege does not exist when statement is excessive);
Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299 (Miss. 1989) (summary judgment appropriate
when no malice is found).
178. For a comparison of several courts' determinations as to what consti-
tutes malice, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
179. Garziano, 818 F.2d at 390.
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Malice is generally difficult to prove, and courts are reluctant
to find it.' 80 In one case, a professor was dismissed for cause after
refusing to teach a class until a student apologized for calling him
a "condescending, patronizing racist" in front of a class.' 8 ' State-
ments made by his colleagues as part of their activity on a griev-
ance committee asserting that "[n]o one representing the
University seems inclined to do anything except to prefer charges
against Dr. McConnell," were found insufficient to overcome the
presumption of good faith.' 82 The court found that the apparent
negligence in researching the facts of the incident before dis-
missing the plaintiff was insufficient to establish malice.
183
This decision indicates the plaintiff's burden of presenting
evidence sufficient to cause defendant to lose a qualified privi-
lege. In light of the evidence that the university acted in accord-
ance with established procedures, the court found no prima facie
case of malice.18 4 The court's holding illustrates that when estab-
lished procedures exist, a qualified privilege is preserved, even if
there is an appearance of malice. Therefore, so long as there are
established procedures, misconduct committee members should
retain their qualified privilege unless they have a conflict of inter-
est or clearly act in bad faith.
In addition to abuse or malice, a qualified privilege can be
lost through negligence. In Beckman v. Dunn,'8 5 the court noted
that the abuse of a conditional privilege included publications ac-
tuated by "malice or negligence .... a purpose other than that for
which the privilege is given, . . .to a person not reasonably be-
lieved to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of
the privilege or [which] includes defamatory matter not reason-
ably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose. '"186
Other jurisdictions hold that a defendant must show a "rea-
sonable belief in the truth of the published information" for a
180. See, e.g., McConnell v. Howard Univ., 621 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1985).
181. Id. at 328. The student called the plaintiff a "racist" after the plaintiff
illustrated students' need to limit class hours by comparing their refusal to take a
reduced course load to a "monkey" who gets his hand caught in a food jar but
refuses to drop the food to save his hand. Id.
182. Id. at 332 n.16.
183. Id. at 332. Failure to establish malice resulted in summary judgment
for the defendant. Id.
184. Id.
185. 419 A.2d 583 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
186. Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 37: p. 13611394
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/3
MISCONDUCT IN SCIENCE
qualified immunity to be preserved. 187 For example, in Zeinfeld v.
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., the court denied the defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the pleadings raised
triable issues of fact regarding good faith and lack of knowledge
of the defendant.' 88 In that case, the defendant had written a let-
ter critical of the plaintiff, a former employee, to a potential em-
ployer of the plaintiff.'18 9
A negligence stipulation could be troublesome to defendants
because plaintiffs could routinely allege negligence as a way of
trying to destroy the qualified privilege. Still, in spite of these
opinions, courts rarely find a defendant to have acted without rea-
sonable care.' 90 This potential problem can be avoided by adher-
ence to institutional policies governing misconduct
investigations. That is, committee members should be diligent in
reviewing all relevant documents and examining all pertinent
witnesses.
IV. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
A. Proposed Federal Legislation
If the liability of institutional misconduct committee mem-
bers were limited unambiguously by statute, institutions could be
more aggressive in initiating their own misconduct investigations
and the subject's peers would be more willing to serve as miscon-
duct committee members. In response to these concerns and the
need to offer whistleblowers protection from retaliation, the Sub-
committee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Com-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology drafted a model bill
called the Science Research Protection Act.191 In keeping with
these concerns, the bill proposed limiting the liability of review
committees. As long as the peer review committee meets the ade-
quate notice and hearing requirements, "no cause of action shall
187. See Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 243 N.E.2d 217 (Ill. 1969)
(holding qualified privilege may be lost if publisher does not believe in truth of
defamatory matter or has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true).
188. Id. at 221.
189. Id. at 219-20.
190. See, e.g., Beckman, 419 A.2d at 583. In Beckman, the court failed to find
a lack of reasonable care when the defendant's opinion of plaintiff was reached
after "considerable exposure to her work" and there was no indication that
there was a lack of diligence or reasonable care. Id. at 588.
191. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHt,
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Dis-
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lie against: (a) the peer review committee; (b) any person acting
as a member or staff of that committee; (c) any person under a
contract or other formal agreement with that committee; and (d)
any person who participates with or assists that committee with
respect to the investigation."'
' 92
Another provision of the bill protects those providing infor-
mation to peer review committees as a witness or in any other
respect, but with the qualification that the information cannot be
false or that the person providing it does not know, and should
not have known, that it was false.' 93 The difference in language
between these two provisions may illustrate that the authors of
the legislation did in fact intend to provide absolute immunity to
the misconduct committee members, although not to witnesses
appearing before the committee.
In addition to the proposed Science Research Protection Act,
which has not been enacted, there are other state and federal stat-
utes that could serve as models for statutory protection of mis-
conduct committee members. As discussed above, misconduct
committee members will probably benefit from a qualified privi-
lege.' 94 Under this construction, however, plaintiffs may still al-
lege bad faith, malice, or activity beyond the scope of the
privilege, embroiling the misconduct committee member in
litigation.
Statutes could provide committee members with additional
protections in several respects. First, a federal statute could give
them absolute immunity as advocated by the Science Research
Protection Act.' 95 Second, a federal statute could be helpful to
misconduct committee members even if it were modeled after
other statutes that provide only the qualified protections already
existing under common law. A statute providing clear qualified
immunity could, for example, reduce the amount of litigation
over whether the context is one to which a qualified privilege ap-
plies and whether a communication is within the scope of that
privilege for the misconduct committee members. Third, if a fed-
eral statute is not feasible, states could pass legislation clearly de-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. For a discussion of why misconduct committee members will benefit
from a qualified immunity privilege, see supra notes 148-55 and accompanying
text.
195. For a discussion of the Science Research Protection Act, see supra
notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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fining the qualified privilege for misconduct in science committee
members.
B. Statutory Protections for Medical Peer Review Committee Members
1. State Statutes
An analogous statutory protection to that sought for miscon-
duct committee members is the "immunity" given to those who
participate in peer review evaluations of doctors. Presently, all
fifty states have statutes giving a varying degree of protection to
certain medical peer reviewers.' 96 Most statutes expressly offer a
qualified immunity for defamation suits while others provide "ab-
solute immunity from all civil actions."'' 97 The absolute immunity
statutes have additional requirements in order for the immunity
to apply, which renders their privileges qualified as well.' 98
One example of an immunity statute is New Jersey's statute,
entitled "Hospital or long-term health care facility committees;
professional review committees; liability of members."' 99 The
statute applies to disputes involving specific kinds of health care
workers as well as to "[a]ny person who serves as a member of, is
staff to, under a contract or other formal agreement with, partici-
pates with, or assists with respect to an action of ... a hospital or
long term health care facility committee." 200 This legislation fur-
ther specifies:
[these individuals] shall not be liable in damages to any
person for any action taken or recommendation made by
him within the scope of his function with the committee
... if such action or recommendation was taken or made
without malice and in the reasonable belief after reason-
able investigation that such action or recommendation
was warranted upon the basis of facts disclosed.20 1
By protecting anyone who "assists" peer review committees,
196. AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, A COMPENDIUM OF STATE PEER RE-
VIEW IMMUNITY LAWS 95 (1988).
197. David W.Jorstad, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants for
Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 692, 694 (1978-79) (dis-
cussing legal liabilities that might be incurred by medical peer review committee
participants).
198. Id. "The statutes providing immunity from all civil liability are gener-
ally qualified by requiring that good faith, lack of malice or reasonableness gov-
ern members of peer review committees .... " Id. (footnotes omitted).
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.10 (West Supp. 1992).
200. Id. § 2A:84A-22.10a.
201. Id. § 2A:84A-22.10e.
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and by including all types of civil liability, New Jersey's statute has
a wide scope. However, like the qualified privileges in the defa-
mation context, the statute requires that the subject act without
malice.20 2 Unlike at common law, the statute demanding that the
reviewer act more carefully in offering an evaluation, requiring
that it be offered with "reasonable belief after reasonable investi-
gation," instead of simply requiring good faith.20 3 Reasonable in-
vestigation could be interpreted as requiring committee members
to examine a certain amount or type of evidence before they draw
conclusions, whereas good faith, although it is a subjective stan-
dard, will probably only require that misconduct committees do
not knowingly make any mistakes.20 4
California also has a statute upon which a model misconduct
committee statute could be based.20 5 This statute provides im-
munity from liability to "any member of any peer review commit-
tee whose purpose is to review the quality of medical services."20 6
The California Code limits the immunity of review committees or
board members by requiring that they act without malice and only
after making reasonable investigation.2 0 7
A code similar to the California statute could be applied to
misconduct committee members, or the California statute could
be amended to include misconduct committee members. Legisla-
tures may choose the exact language carefully, and if the statute
were modeled after the California statute, institutions would need
202. The New Jersey statute requires action to be "taken or made without
malice." Id.
203. Id.
204. Pennsylvania has a statute that is similar to New Jersey's requirement
that committee members act with "due care" to receive the qualified privilege.
See 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.3(b)(1) (1992). See generally Andrew L. Mer-
ritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1266 &
n.1 18 (1987). Merritt differentiates between privilege and immunity statutes.
He distinguishes the former as more protective than the latter because privilege
statutes shield committee members from the annoyance of even a limited in-
volvement in civil litigation in which other persons are the named defendants.
However, the language of the statutes often is not clear on which it is offering.
Id. at 1253 n.63. For a discussion of the qualified privilege good faith standard,
see supra notes 168-84 and accompanying text.
205. CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.7(b) (West 1992).
206. Id.
207. Id. Immunity attaches under the California statute if
[the] member acts without malice, has made a reasonable effort to ob-
tain the facts of the matter as to which he, she, or it acts, and acts in
reasonable belief that the action taken by him, her, or it is warranted by
the facts known to him, her, or it after the reasonable effort to obtain
facts.
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to carefully prescribe in their by-laws the formation and proce-
dure of misconduct committees.
Other states provide different protections to members of re-
view committees. Some statutes are written broadly enough that,
as drafted, they appear to apply to misconduct committee mem-
bers' activities. For example, New York's statute, "Proceedings in
cases of professional misconduct," gives a three-step process for
addressing allegations, including a state licensing board, a re-
gents review committee, and court review. 20 8 One provision of
this law stipulates that "consultants or expert witnesses" who
help "the department" in investigations of alleged professional
misconduct "shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or
proceeding as a result of such assistance, except upon proof of
actual malice." 20 9 This statute could also be construed to protect
misconduct by committee members by including them in the defi-
nition of "professionals." 2 10
2. Federal Statute
In 1986, Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act (HCQIA) to provide uniform minimum protection for
activities of professional review organizations. 21 1 The HCQIA
defines professional review activities and renders the body, the
members, those under contract, and anyone participating or as-
sisting the body "not liable in damages under any law of the
United States or of any State." 212 The HCQIA specifies that re-
view action may only be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the fur-
therance of quality health care, (2) after a reasonable ef-
fort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after adequate
notice and hearing procedures . . ., (4) in the reasonable
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known
after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after
208. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6510 (McKinney 1985).
209. Id. § 6510(7).
210. The statute itself does not specify the kind of professional misconduct
proceedings to which its provisions apply, and it may refer only to proceedings
involving professionals licensed by the board of regents of the state. See id.
§ 6510.
211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988). The HCQIA was amended in 1989
to preempt state laws giving less protection to peer review participants than the
federal law. Budget Reconciliation Act of Dec. 19, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6103, 103 Stat. 2208 (1989). The amendments appear at 42 U.S.C. § 11115(a)
(Supp. 11 1990).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 11111 (1988).
1992] 1399
39
Berg and Fisher: Liability of Individuals Who Serve on Panels Reviewing Allegation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).213
The language in the HCQIA that defines "professional re-
view action" could easily be amended to apply to the limited pow-
ers of the review committees. The HCQIA defines a professional
review action as "an action or recommendation of a professional
review body which is taken or made in the conduct of professional
review activity, which is based on the competence or professional
conduct of an individual physician." 2 14 If this language were
amended to include scientists, as well as physicians, the HCQJA
could be interpreted as applying to committee members.
One shortcoming of modifying the HCQIA to apply to the
scientific misconduct area is that the "reasonable effort to obtain
facts" requirement would restrict the protections available to mis-
conduct committee members. A statute containing this "reason-
able effort" requirement in the misconduct in science area would
not be fair to committee members because as scientific peers of
the subject, they may not be experienced in conducting such in-
vestigations. Furthermore, the individual committee member
does not directly determine the fate of the subject and may even
disagree with the administrator's decision. 21 5 Therefore, tying
immunity to whether the final action is warranted, as the HCQJA
does, would be inappropriate in a statute addressing misconduct
committees.
The legislative history of the HCQIA explains that "reason-
able belief" replaced good faith as a standard because the draft-
ers felt that good faith might require an interpretation of the
subjective state of mind of the reviewers. 216 The new test is satis-
fied if the reviewers, with the information available to them at the
time of the action, could have reasonably concluded that their ac-
tion would restrict incompetent behavior. 21 7 In this regard, how-
ever, the two scenarios-medical and research-are different.
The medical peer review committees may have a more specific
charge with respect to the committee's deliberations, and more
experience evaluating their colleagues. Consequently, they have
more power to take formal "review actions."
213. Id. § 11112.
214. Id. § 11151(9).
215. Institutional procedures often provide for a panel to provide a report
to an institutional administrator, who then has discretion whether to accept the
panel's findings and conclusions.
216. H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6392-93.
217. Id.
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The purpose of the medical peer review statutes is similar to
the purpose of a statute that would govern misconduct committee
members' liability. Thus, the latter could be drafted in a similar
way to accomplish a similar goal. The expressed purpose of
Maryland's statute, for example, was to further "the important
public policy of protecting the welfare of patients by assuring the
free exchange of information during the deliberations of medical
review committees. 2 18  Likewise, the federal statute was
designed to "improve the quality of medical care by encouraging
physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are in-
competent or . . . unprofessional.- 2 1 9 The purpose behind any
immunity or qualified privilege for misconduct committee mem-
bers would also be to promote honest, high quality research.
Maryland's statute is simple, and could serve as a model for a
federal law giving immunity to misconduct committee members.
Because the statute does not have a "reasonable belief" require-
ment, a misconduct committee statute based on this statute would
produce less litigation. The pertinent part of the statute provides
that
a person who acts in good faith and within the scope of
jurisdiction of a medical review committee is not civilly
liable for any action as a member of the medical review
committee or for giving information to, participating in,
or contributing to the function of the medical review
committee.2 2
0
This simple provision, without the requirement of "reasonable
belief," should clearly give misconduct committee members a
qualified privilege for their good faith activities as part of serving
on the committees.
V. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
Under the common law of most states, or pursuant to any
federal or state statute that legislatures might draft to apply to
misconduct in science committee members, plaintiffs who allege
malice or activity beyond the scope of any privilege may bring
cases that could survive a motion for summary judgment. 221
218. Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp. of Md., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 657, 661 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 871 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1989).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 11111 (1988).
220. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-393(b) (Supp. 1992).
221. This possibility is indicated in dicta of the court's opinion in Greenya
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Other factors, however, should prevent a burgeoning of suits on
this basis. For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, as revised in 1983, empowers courts to sanction attorneys
for filing frivolous suits. This sanction may deter the proliferation
of these suits. 222 Federal courts have enforced these provisions in
similar situations to one in which a scientist would allege malice
based on insubstantial evidence. 223 If the Rule 11 sanctions are
enforced they should act to prevent frivolous suits under both
common law and statutes. Additional protections, such as indem-
nification, should also reduce the impact on individual miscon-
duct committee members of any lawsuits that do occur.
A. Indemnification
One partial solution to the problem of liability of members of
institutional misconduct committees is indemnification by the in-
stitutions sponsoring the committees. 224 This indemnification
may occur in several ways. The committee members, if they are
employees of the institution, may be indemnified by employment
contracts, by-laws of the institution, or specific indemnification
agreements.2 25 Alternatively, the institution may have a policy of
indemnifying those who serve the institution in any capacity. If
not clearly indemnified, committee members should request such
indemnification from their institutions.
While indemnification may protect the committee member
from having to pay legal fees to defend against frivolous suits,
indemnification agreements are only a partial protection against
liability because they often contain the same good faith require-
ments as the common law.226 Avoiding conflicts of interest is one
way to keep within the purview of the indemnification agree-
ments, just as it is a way to insure that qualified privileges remain
v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Further research
has revealed no cases that have upheld allegations of bad faith.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
223. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d
Cir. 1985) (finding no reasonable grounds for lawsuit), modified, 821 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1987); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600 (1st Cir.
1988) (holding attorney fees were appropriate sanction against attorney for
prosecution of frivolous claim against defendant).
224. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, at 341 (defining indemnity as order re-
quiring another to reimburse in full one who has discharged common liability).
225. Id. (describing grounds for indemnity).
226. Id. (stating that "there can be no indemnity in favor of the intentional
or reckless tortfeasor").
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an effective protection for misconduct committee members. The
following is a review of two illustrative institutional policies.
1. Harvard University's Policy
Harvard has experienced no recent suits against its tenure
committee members. The Sixteenth Statute (by-law) governing
Harvard's Faculty of Arts and Sciences provides that
indemnification of persons serving or who have served
as officers, employees or other agents of the University,
or at its request, as members .... employees .... or other
agents of an ... organization in which the University has
an interest may be provided by the University whenever
and to the extent authorized by a disinterested majority
of the members of the Corporation or ... of the Board
of Overseers.
227
The indemnification includes payment by the University of
expenses incurred in defending an action. 228 This indemnifica-
tion covers only good faith activities based on a reasonable belief
that an action was in the best interest of the University. 22 9 While
this is a relatively low threshold for coverage, the by-law still of-
fers only partial protection.
2. New York University's Policy
New York University (NYU) indemnifies its professors in a
similar fashion. 230 This protection, pursuant to the State Board
of Regent's requirements, indemnifies persons involved in litiga-
tion through their service to NYU. The policy covers expenses,
including attorneys' fees, and although it does not have an ex-
press good faith requirement, it does exclude proceedings in
which it is adjudged that such person "is liable for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties." 23' Moreover,
NYU's indemnification policy includes a provision specifically re-
ferring to "faculty members of other institutions of higher learn-
ing (who) often participate in tenure and promotion evaluations
of members of the New York University Faculty." 232 In the event
227. HARVARD UNIVERSITY'S FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, SIXTEENTH
STATUTE, October 1987, at 8.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK.
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that these persons are not protected by their own universities,
NYU gives them the same protection as it gives its own faculty.
2 33
Notwithstanding the value of these programs, indemnifica-
tion does not provide a complete defense for science committee
members. Indemnification will only prevent the individual com-
mittee member from incurring the monetary costs of a defense,
not the other negative aspects, such as inconvenience and per-
haps unwanted publicity. Additionally, indemnification will likely
contain some form of a good faith requirement.
B. "Framework for Institutional Policies and Procedures to Deal with
Fraud in Research"
The "Framework for Institutional Policies and Procedures to
Deal with Fraud in Research" was developed by ajoint committee
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) and the American Bar Association (ABA) at a 1989 meet-
ing of the AAAS/ABA National Conference of Lawyers and Scien-
tists. This "framework" refers generally to the potential liability
of misconduct in science committee members but does not di-
rectly address the issue. The framework advises committee mem-
bers to make sure that they have no real or apparent conflicts of
interest. According to the framework, a conflict of interest is a
factor that a plaintiff scientist could use to support an allegation
of bad faith in a libel suit against individual misconduct commit-
tee members. Thus, the framework is a good example of a policy
that, if adopted and adhered to by an institution, could help that
institution's committee members avoid liability.
The framework also suggests that institutions consult their
own legal counsel to minimize the risk of institutional liability for
the actions taken after their inquiry and investigation.2 34 Institu-
233. Id. at 110.
234. The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine discusses the role
of the School's Office of General Counsel in a section on "Procedures for Deal-
ing with Issues of Professional Misconduct" in the 1990 "Faculty Policies" hand-
book. THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, FACULTY POLICIES
15 (1990). The duty of the Office of General Counsel is to render advice to the
committees, including the Advisory Committee on Professional Misconduct, the
Standing Committee on Professional Misconduct, and various ad hoc commit-
tees, all composed entirely of school faculty members or administrators. Id. at
23. According to the policy, "individuals serving in any of these capacities are
encouraged to seek legal guidance regarding any procedural question, particu-
larly in connection with the preparation of written reports of actions taken, or
before any action is taken with respect to any person believed to have made an
accusation in bad faith." Id. This probably reflects the University administra-
tors' perception that actions taken following misconduct committee investiga-
1404 (Vol. 37: p. 1361
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tions should also make clear any policies on providing legal coun-
sel to plaintiffs and respondents. This approach would eliminate
confusion among committee members about their potential liabil-
ity. The framework also indicates that the greatest liability risk is
for the institutions as a whole rather than individual committee
members because of state doctrines of respondeat superior or in-
demnity provisions that often indemnify their faculty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Committee members who participate in good faith in miscon-
duct hearings should be exempt from defamation liability. Gen-
erally, committee members will be protected by a qualified
privilege so long as they avoid conflicts of interest and do not act
outside the scope of the privilege. Unfortunately, the scope of
the common law qualified privileges in defamation actions is un-
clear in many jurisdictions. In spite of the low ultimate likelihood
of liability, and because of increased publicity, some scientists
may still be deterred from serving on investigation committees.
The ideal protection for committee members is to promul-
gate state and federal statutes that grant absolute immunity to
misconduct in science committee members. At the very least,
committee members should be protected by federal or state stat-
utes granting unequivocal qualified immunity for their good faith
participation in misconduct committee investigations.
Until such statutory protection is available, it is up to institu-
tions to protect their faculty. Institutions should set clear guide-
lines detailing the participation of employees in misconduct in
science committee investigations, monitor the investigations to
ensure compliance withthe institutions' guidelines, and provide
indemnification for those employees who comply in good faith
with the institutions' procedures.
tions could be perceived as a retaliation against whistleblowers, for example if
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